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Perhaps not surprisingly, the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001 (the "Fund"), even in its short life span,' has generated praise,
condemnation, controversy, and a great deal of attention. Since the inception
of the Fund, commentators have been drawn to speculating about its future
significance,2 particularly whether the Fund will be used as a model for tort
reform and whether the policy choices made with respect to administrating the
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1. The Fund was passed as Title IV of the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (the "Air Safety Act"). In establishing the Fund, the United
States Department of Justice published a Notice of Inquiry and Advance Notice of Rulemaking
on November 5, 2001 seeking "public comment on a range of matters critical to
[implementation of the] program that will carry out the intent of the legislation of providing
compensation to victims." September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
55,901, 55,901 (Nov. 5, 2001). The Interim Final Rule was published December 21, 2001.
September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 5, 2001)
(codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2003)) [hereinafter Interim Rule]. The Final Rule
was published on March 13, 2002. September 1 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67
Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104 (2003)) [hereinafter Final
Rule]. The Fund is slated to expire when all claims have been processed.
The deadline for filing a claim with the Fund was December 22, 2003. September 11 th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,28 C.F.R. § 104.62 (2003). Over 97% of eligible families
ultimately decided to file with the Fund. Fifty of the 2976 eligible families failed to file either
a lawsuit or a claim with the Fund. David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes
Effort as a Success, With Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at BI.
2. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of
September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 587-89 (2001) (stating that "government intervention
to provide no-fault benefits remains a chancier proposition" than traditional tort law); Larry S.
Stewart et al., The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Past or Prologue?, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 153, 171 (2002) (suggesting that the Fund will "not likely serve as a model for future
'reform' of the American civil justice system"); Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of
Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1265, 1284 (2002) (stating that the success or failure of the
Fund "will be closely watched ... because of the precedent it has established in terms of
Congressional intervention into the tort process"); Cynthia C. Lebow, Understanding the
September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund: The ProperResponse or a Dangerous Precedent?,
in 1 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 243 (ATLA ed., 2002), WL I Ann.
2002 ATLA-CLE 243.
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Fund are desirable and deserve to be replicated. It is not so much that people
expect Congress or the states to enact similar compensation schemes anytime
soon to deal with the many other disasters and crises that jeopardize the lives
and health of accident victims.3 Rather, it is that the Fund is likely to become
a benchmark of sorts for what constitutes appropriate compensation in tandem
with, or perhaps in contrast to, compensation in tort.
The focus of this Article is quite narrow. I examine some little-known
features of the Fund that are particularly relevant to rethinking and reassessing
the element of damages in injury and compensation law. Particularly because
so many of the victims of September 1 1th died,4 the Fund has special
importance for damages in wrongful death cases, thus providing a rare
opportunity to reflect on how the law measures the value of a person's life,
while simultaneously providing for the needs of those left behind.
Despite its practical importance, the law of wrongful death is a subject that
seldom captures the imagination of torts scholars.5 The recent literature, for
example, has little to say about fundamental questions of social policy
connected to wrongful death recovery, such as what constitutes a "family" or
whether compensation should be reserved exclusively for surviving economic
dependents or should be more broadly available to persons who have legal
rights in a deceased's estate. Nor is there currently a live debate as to whether
wrongful death recovery should be thought of primarily in individual terms (as
compensating for what the deceased individual lost) or in collective terms as
a mechanism for providing financial security for the survivors (as
compensating for the losses of family members).
In this Article, I focus on specific features of the Fund that bear upon these
fundamental questions. After a brief excursion into the genesis of the Fund,
I look at the process for calculating economic and noneconomic damages to
see whether there is any discernible philosophy underlying the Fund which we
might draw upon in the future.
3. The fate of one major piece of proposed federal legislation that would create a fund
to compensate asbestos victims is uncertain because the contending forces have yet to determine
the size of pay-outs to claimants. See Panel Adds Money to Asbestos Fund; Payments Still at
Issue, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2003, § 3, at 4.
4. By latest count, 2749 persons died in the attacks on the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and in the Shanksville, Pennsylvania crash. Death Toll at 2,749, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
24, 2004, at Al. An additional 2337 persons were injured but survived the attacks. Martin
Kasindorf, Some 9/11 Families Choose Lawsuits over Federal Fund, U.S.A. TODAY, July 14,
2003, at IA.
5. One notable recent exception is John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of
Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the
Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 717, 731-49 (2000) (discussing the
historical development of wrongful death statutes).
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I. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE FUND
Perhaps the most repeated observation made about the September 1 1 th
Victim Compensation Fund, like the horrible events which brought it into
being, is that it is unique and has no close parallel in the history of United
States injury and compensation law.6 At first blush, because the Fund is a no-
fault scheme,7 it might seem superficially to resemble workers' compensation
or automobile no-fault systems. The differences in these schemes, however,
are too significant to make the analogy appropriate.
First, the Fund is not an exclusive remedy. Victims may decide to opt out,
waive their right to compensation under the Fund, and sue in tort instead.8
Although Congress provided disincentives for victims to sue by limiting
liability in tort9 and provided a single venue for all claims,'0 some suits have
nevertheless been filed. " Particularly for those families of victims who intend
to use the tort litigation to discover facts about the highjackings and the
inadequacy of security measures taken by the airlines and other potential
defendants, a lawsuit offers something that the Fund was not set up to do.
2
Second, the Fund is an event-based rather than a status-based scheme.'
3
It is unlike workers' compensation, for example, in which the injured party's
status as an employee and his or her ongoing relationship to the employer
trigger the right to compensation. This feature of the Fund may mean that its
6. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J.
121, 123-26 (2002).
7. See Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c), 115 Stat. 230, 23940 (2001)
(eligibility requirements).
8. See Air Safety Act § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 240.
9. Importantly, liability for the airlines was capped at the limits of the liability insurance
coverage maintained by the air carrier. See Air Safety Act § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 240. In
subsequent legislation, a similar cap tied to insurance coverage was placed on suits against
aircraft manufacturers, property owners in the World Trade Center, airport owners and
governmental entities. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §
201(b)(2), 115 Stat. 597, 64546 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
10. An exclusive federal forum was created in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. See Air Safety Act § 408(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 241.
11. For example, in the three days close to the second anniversary of the September 11 th
attacks, over 50 lawsuits were filed. Kara Scannell & Jess Bravin, Flurry of Lawsuits Mark
Anniversary of Sept. 11 Attacks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1 1,2003, at A3. New York residents have
until March 2004 to file wrongful death suits. Id. Just before the deadline for filing with the
Fund, however, forty people who had originally filed lawsuits decided to file with the Fund,
reducing the total number of lawsuits to thirty-nine. Chen, supra note 1, at B I.
12. Interview with Attorney Mary Schiavo and Jacques Debeuneure, The Early Show
(CBS television broadcast, July 31, 2003) (discussing waiving financial aid from victim
compensation fund in order to sue airlines and others for 9/11 attacks).
13. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88
VA. L. REv. 1831, 1838 (2002).
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influence will ultimately be quite limited, amounting to little more than a
footnote in the torts casebooks, similar to the impact of such programs as the
childhood vaccine compensation fund. 4 Creation of the Fund certainly has
raised questions about the "horizontal" equity of providing compensation for
this particular group of terrorist attack victims, when no compensation is
available for victims of the Oklahoma City bombing or for those persons
injured in non-terrorist catastrophes like mining disasters."
Third, the Fund is unusual in that it provides a fairly generous recovery for
economic losses and also some award for noneconomic losses to survivors and
families of victims.'6 Significantly, the average award under the Fund is
approximately $1.5 million, tax-free. 7 The usual quidpro quo for receiving
no-fault benefits is that the injured party must give up the right to recover
noneconomic damages in exchange for a speedy recovery of economic
damages and elimination of the need to prove negligence. Moreover, under
workers' compensation schemes, for example, the amounts of recovery even
for economic losses have been lower than recovery in tort; typically, workers'
compensation claimants recover only a portion of their lost wages. 9 As
someone who has written about the importance of noneconomic damages in
tort law,2" I am intrigued by the unusual mix of economic and noneconomic
damages available under the Fund.
14. See Mullenix &Stewart, supra note 6, at 133-34 (referring to The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3756 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 300aa (2000))).
15. See Stewart et al., supra note 2, at 165-67 (discussing unsuccessful legislative efforts
to expand Fund coverage to include victims of other terrorist attacks).
16. The Special Master of the Fund has described it as providing "an unprecedented level
of federal financial assistance for surviving victims and the families of deceased victims." Final
Rule, supra note 1, at 11,233.
17. Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, American Morning (CNN television broadcast,
Sept. 11, 2003).
18. For example, workers' compensation benefits generally cover only economic losses
(medical bills, wage replacement, and rehabilitation) and provide no recovery for pain and
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, or other non-pecuniary losses. See 6 ARTHUR LARSON &
LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 100.05 (2003). Similarly, under
the typical automobile no-fault plans, only economic losses are provided. See Gary T.
Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L.
REv. 611,622-23 (2000).
19. For example, the weekly benefit for workers who are totally disabled is typically
computed by multiplying their pre-injury average weekly wages by 50% to 66.67%, up to a
maximum amount set by state law. 5 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 18, § 93.01 [1 ][a]. The
maximum amounts are generally set as a percentage of the state's average weekly wage. See
5 id. § 93.04[l]-[2].
20. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146
U. PA. L. REv. 463, 528-30 (1998) [hereinafter The Architecture of Bias]; Martha Chamallas
with Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814
(1990).
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Fourth and finally, the origin of the Fund indicates that it was designed as
much to bail out the airlines as to compensate the victims of the attacks.2 The
Fund is financed with general revenues from the federal treasury,22 in contrast
to workers' compensation, which is typically financed by employers through
the purchase of insurance. 23 Thus, when an award is made under the Fund to
a 9/11 victim, neither the airlines nor any other potentially negligent actor will
be affected either directly or indirectly. This method of funding takes away
the deterrent effect of any recovery from the Fund.
These peculiar features of the Fund provide a revealing comparison and
contrast to both traditional tort recovery and prototypical no-fault schemes.
The Fund gives us an opportunity to imagine what the contours of
compensation might look like if two important considerations were met: (1) if
we were not concerned with deterring behavior by the defendant; and (2) if we
regarded the victim as a worthy claimant who deserved compensation. The
Fund thus allows us to focus on the "damages element" of injury law, freed
from issues of liability that often overshadow the damages element in tort
litigation.
In media reports about the Fund and in comments submitted during the
administrative process that followed passage of the legislation creating the
Fund, fundamental questions about the basic objectives of personal injury
compensation surfaced that rarely get debated, even in first-year torts classes.
Critics and supporters alike asked difficult, policy-laden questions like:
Should the life of a stock broker be worth more than the life of a waiter? 4
Should the particular circumstances surrounding a person's death matter?25
How should the pain and suffering and other losses of family members be
evaluated?26
For the most part, Congress had little specific to say about these questions
or about the general compensation philosophy underlying the Fund. In its
haste to establish the Fund to provide immediate economic relief to the
airlines, Congress left most of these important policy choices to Kenneth R.
21. See Mullenix & Stewart, supra note 6, at 127.
22. See Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
23. Depending on the state, employers may purchase workers' compensation insurance
through a private insurance carrier or from a state workers' compensation fund, or they can self-
insure and pay workers directly. Approximately 63% of benefits are paid by private insurance
carriers, with state funds and self-insurance accounting for about 23% and 14% respectively.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, REPORT OF NATIONAL
COMMISSION (1972), reprinted in 10 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 18, app. E, at 21.
24. See Emily Bazelon, Equal Pay for Equal Death: Does the 9/11 Fund Think Bankers
Matter More Than Electricians? (July 1, 2002), Microsoft Network, at
http://www.slate.msn.com/id/2067575/.
25. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,237-38.
26. See id. at 11,239 (discussing comments received regarding how the distinctive pain
and suffering of victims and family members ought to be evaluated).
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Feinberg, the person appointed as Special Master of the Fund.27 Many thought
that Mr. Feinberg was the ideal choice for the position. He had earned a
reputation for his skillful handling of mass tort cases, including Agent Orange,
diethylstilbestrol (DES), Dalkon Shield, and asbestos; and, as Senator Edward
Kennedy's former chief of staff, he was not likely to be opposed by Democrats
in Congress.2" Not surprisingly, however, as Mr. Feinberg set about his job of
administering the Fund, he became a more controversial figure.29
A New York Times article by Lisa Belkin, written shortly after the Fund
was established, explains the politics that brought the Fund into being and
provides insight into the cross-cutting values expressed by the Act.3" Ms.
Belkin recounts that shortly after September 11 th, the airlines advised the
President and Congress that, due to the losses they incurred as a result of the
attacks and its aftermath, they might have to stop flying unless Congress
subsidized the industry to a significant degree.3 From the outset, a primary
function of the legislation was to provide relief for the airlines industry,
including tort immunity.32 Specifically, the White House wanted to limit the
liability of the airlines to the amount of insurance that they carried. However,
Democrats in Congress refused to allow such limitation unless there was also
a mechanism for compensating victims.3 Congress quickly compromised and
combined the two approaches. Under the Act, victims would be able to
recover, without proof of fault, from a Fund financed by the federal
government.34 If they chose to sue in tort, however, the airlines' liability
would be limited by the amount of insurance carried.35
The victims' choice of whether to receive compensation under the Fund
or to sue in tort has been a difficult one because of the risk that only those who
are first to sue will actually receive compensation before the available
insurance funds are depleted. Moreover, those who opt to sue confront the
very real difficulty of proving liability based on negligence. Family members
suing for the death of passengers on the planes may find it relatively easy to
prove that the injuries suffered were foreseeable, a showing related to proof
of both negligence and proximate cause. Those suing on behalf of persons
who perished in the towers or on the ground, however, will likely find it more
27. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value
of Three Thousand Lives, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2003, at 42.
28. See id. at 43-44.
29. See Lena H. Sun, Take a Number: The Sept. I 1 Fund Mediator, Putting a Dollar Sign
on Death's Toll, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at C1, C8 (describing Mr. Feinberg's self-
confident, brusque style).
30. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine) at 92.
31. Id. at 94.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c), § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230,239-40 (2001)
(eligibility requirements and source of funding).
35. Air Safety Act § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 240.
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difficult to convince a factfinder that it was foreseeable that a plane would be
used as a missile.36
For victims who choose compensation under the Fund, an award is
guaranteed and only the amount of the award is at issue. Under the broad
congressional mandate, the Special Master of the Fund has enormous
discretion, more than is usually given to a judge or jury. In general terms, the
legislation provides that the amount of compensation shall be based on "the
harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances
of the claimant."37 This broad language gives the Special Master the ability
to consider the financial need of surviving family members, as well as
particulars of the death and earning capacity of the deceased. As designed, the
Fund compensates only for physical injury or death. Awards are restricted to
an individual (or personal representative of a deceased individual3") who was
physically injured or killed as a result of the attacks, 39 thus excluding persons
who suffered only mental distress, property damage, economic loss, or
exposure to toxins that might cause disease in the future.
In two key respects, however, Mr. Feinberg's discretion was curtailed.
First, Congress provided that there would be a deduction for the sums which
claimants received from collateral sources, including "life insurance, pension
funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local
governments"40 related to the attacks. On this point, the legislation looks more
like a typical tort reform measure where the collateral source rule has long
36. See In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also
Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence oflnjury,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1247 (2002); Anthony J. Sebok, Defending the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund. Why in the End, The Plan is Fair to All, (Feb. 11, 2002),
FindLaw.com, at http://www.srit.news.findlaw.com/sebok/2002021 1.html. However,
approximately 70 victims and their representatives who filed suit against the airlines, airport
security companies, an airplane manufacturer, and the owners and operators of the World Trade
Center recently withstood a motion to dismiss their claims. See September 11 Litig., 280 F.
Supp. 2d at 287. The court ruled that the claims of both the passengers on the hijacked planes
and persons on the ground could proceed, finding that the defendants owed a duty even to
persons on the ground and that the intervening criminal acts of the terrorists did not break the
chain of causation as a matter of law. Id. at 295-97.
37. Air Safety Act § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. at 238.
38. The personal representative is defined as "an individual appointed by a court of
competent jurisdiction as the Personal Representative of the decedent or as the executor or
administrator of the decedent's will or estate." See Interim Rule, supra note 1, at 66,277. Once
the award is granted under the Fund, the personal representative is to distribute the award
consistent with: (1) the deceased's will; (2) state law governing intestate succession; or (3) a
court ruling in the state where the victim was domiciled. Id. However, the rules provide that
if the Special Master determines that such distribution will not adequately compensate the
deceased's spouse, children, or other relatives, he may intervene and order a different
distribution. Id.
39. Air Safety Act § 405(c), 115 Stat. at 239.
40. Air Safety Act §§ 402(4), 405(b)(6), 115 Stat. at 237-38.
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been under attack.4' The notable effect of this limitation is that some families
might not be entitled to an award of any amount under the Fund if collateral
sources cover all their authorized losses.42 Second, Congress expressly
prohibited the award of punitive damages under the Fund.43 This restriction
has proved less controversial than the first, despite the debate that usually
accompanies the topic of punitive damages." Because the Fund offers no
possibility for deterrent or punitive effects, the usual rationales for allowing
such non-compensatory monetary damages are inapplicable.
Overall, the legislation and the rules adopted pursuant to the legislation
create a curious hybrid system: it is partly a social insurance fund, resembling
the standard no-fault plan, and partly a process for individualized justice that
is more tort-like in character.45 Professor Robert Rabin believes that the dual
nature of the plan is fitting because it reflects the "love-hate relationship"
Americans have with the tort system.46 I interpret this remark to mean that
when it comes to the torts system, Americans are deeply ambivalent. On the
one hand, we love it ("it provides justice for the individual"). On the other
hand, the love affair lasts only until the victim collects. It is at this point that
hostility towards the system and its beneficiaries tends to surface ("they're
greedy, it's a lottery") and the legitimacy of awards begins to be questioned.
II. CONTROVERSIAL CHOICES: THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
The most interesting aspects of the Fund are found not in the statutory
provisions but in the administrative rules that Mr. Feinberg subsequently
fashioned to guide his discretion.47 Although claimants may elect to secure an
41. In approximately half the states, tort reform statutes have changed the collateral
source rule in some categories of tort cases. See I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 3.8(1), at 376 (2d ed. 1993). Under New York law, for example, collateral sources are
generally deductible, except for life insurance. Plaintiffs, however, may recover an amount
equal to the cost of premiums paid for two years prior to the accident and an amount equal to
the cost of maintaining coverage. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(c) (McKinney Supp. 2003).
42. Mr. Feinberg has taken the position that the Act does not permit him to create a
mandatory legal rule requiring a minimum payout after collateral source deductions. However,
he has announced that he will exercise his discretion to consider the needs of a victim's family
to assure that only rarely will a claimant receive less than $250,000, and then only in cases
where the family has received very substantial compensation from collateral sources. See
Victim Compensation Fund Frequently Asked Questions § 5.9, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/faq5.pdf (last modified Dec. 19, 2003).
43. Air Safety Act § 405(b)(5), 115 Stat. at 239.
44. See, e.g., Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 469 (2001) (symposium issue).
45. The Special Master has stated that "no single analogy should dictate the compensation
under the Fund." Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,237.
46. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 576.
47. See supra note 1.
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individualized hearing if they are not satisfied with the award yielded by the
rules,48 the rules provide a critical starting point for compensation. This
section of my Article zeroes in on those rules designed to aid in the calculation
of damages. I am most concerned with rules that have distributional or social
consequences-that is, those rules that embody choices that tend to advantage
or to disadvantage affluent versus less privileged victims, that tend to favor
married over single persons or unmarried couples, or that tend to have a
special impact on women.
These policy choices are not always apparent on the face of the regulation
but are embedded in three points in the regulations: (1) the rules governing
presumed economic losses;49 (2) the provisions relating to calculation of future
earning potential of female victims and the valuing of homemakers'
contributions;50 and (3) the approach taken with respect to calculating
noneconomic losses."' In many respects, the rules governing the Fund mirror
policy choices found in traditional tort law, especially with respect to the
calculation of economic losses. In other respects, however, most specifically
when it comes to the award of noneconomic damages, the rules depart
markedly from tort law and point to very different conceptions of equity and
entitlement.
A. Presumed Economic Losses
For most claimants, the most significant portion of their award will be the
amount they receive to compensate for economic losses sustained due to the
death of the victim.52 To give potential claimants an estimate of how much
they should expect to be awarded under the Fund, Mr. Feinberg devised a
"presumed award" chart or grid to calculate economic losses.5" The grid is
based primarily on the age and prior income level of the victim.54 It follows
48. Interim Rule, supra note 1, § 104.33, at 66,285 (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. §
104.43 (2003)).
49. See id. §§ 104.43, 104.45, at 66,286 (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.43,
104.45 (2003)).
50. See id. § 104.43(c), at 66,286 (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(c) (2003)).
51. See id. §§ 104.44, 104.46, at 66,286-87 (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.44, 104.46
(2003)).
52. To date, the average award under the Fund has been approximately$1.5 million. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text. The amount for noneconomic damages is set at
$250,000 for each decedent, with an additional $100,000 for each spouse or dependent. 28
C.F.R. § 104.44. Thus, if a victim left a spouse and one child, the survivors would receive
$450,000 in noneconomic damages. To reach the average award, that family would then have
to receive $1,050,000 in economic damages.
53. See Interim Rule, supra note 1, § 104.43-.45, at 66,286 (codified as amended at 28
C.F.R. § 104.43-.45 (2003)); Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,236-42.
54. See Interim Rule, supra note 1, § 104.43, at 66,286 (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R.
§ 104.43 (2003)).
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a basic principle in tort compensation, namely, that the calculation of
economic damages is designed to restore victims (or, in cases of wrongful
death, the families of victims) to the position they were in before the
accident." This "status quo ante" feature of the grid means that the "disparity"
in the valuing of a human life that is built into the torts system is replicated in
the award of economic losses through the Fund. For example, the families of
high-earning stock brokers will generally receive a much higher award than
the families of lower-earning waiters.
Under the grid, in cases involving a claim based on the death of the victim,
a percentage is deducted that represents the amount that the deceased would
have spent on personal consumption during his or her lifetime.56 The theory
behind the "personal consumption" deduction is that the family is not entitled
to recoup that amount because the deceased would not have used it to defray
household expenses or to pay for other needs of the survivors.57 To this extent,
the personal consumption deduction seems to embrace the perspective of the
survivors and seeks to determine what the family (as opposed to the victim)
has lost as a result of the death.
The personal consumption deduction is also a standard feature in wrongful
death litigation,58 although there is no uniformity among the states as to the
55. See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01 (2003) (defining the primary purpose of tort
damages as an effort to "place the injured party in the same position that party would have
occupied had the wrong not occurred"); I DOBBS,supra note 41, § 3.1, at 281 ("[D]amages is
an instrument of corrective justice, an effort to put plaintiff in his or her rightful position.").
56. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,238; see 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(a); U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE,
EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC LOSS 3 (Aug. 27, 2002),
available at http:www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc_matrices.pdf. When the injured party
survives, there is no personal consumption deduction. In such cases of personal injury,
presumably the victim still needs to consume goods throughout his or her life and thus may
appropriately demand compensation to offset these continuing needs.
57. The explanation of the process for computing presumed economic loss that appears
on the Fund's website states that "[tihis subtraction [for personal consumption] is a standard
adjustment in evaluating loss of earnings in wrongful death claims because some amount of the
income the victim would have contributed to the household would have been consumed
personally by the deceased and not available to other household members." EXPLANATION OF
PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC LOSS, supra note 56, at 3; see also Kent C.
Krause & John A. Swiger, Analysis ofthe Department ofJustice Regulations for the September
llth Victim Compensation Fund, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 117, 126-27 (2002).
58. Krause & Swiger, supra note 57, at 127. The authors conclude that there are no
material differences between the method used to calculate the personal consumption deduction
under the Fund and traditional tort law. Id. Under the Fund, however, the personal
consumption deduction is applied to after-tax (rather than pre-tax) income, a feature that serves
to lower the amount of the consumption offset. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,238. The
fact that the personal consumption deduction is a standard feature in tort law and is generally
endorsed by forensic economics recently led a federal district court to conclude that its adoption
by Mr. Feinberg was not outside his authority under the Air Safety Act. See Colaio v. Feinberg,
262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 298-301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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precise method to be used for its calculation." Moreover, following the
typical practice in tort litigation, under the Fund's presumed award charts,
personal consumption rates are much higher for single decedents without
dependents than they are for persons who die leaving a spouse or dependents. 60
Thus, for example, the personal consumption rate for a single person without
dependents who earns $60,000 per year is 61.7%, while the comparable rate
for a married decedent with a spouse or for a decedent leaving one dependent
child is 17.8%.6' As a result, the presumed award calculated for a single
decedent (with no surviving children) is much lower than it is for a married
decedent of the same age and income profile.62 For example, the presumed
economic and noneconomic loss for a single decedent, age 40, earning
$60,000 with no dependents is $686,071, as compared to $1,286,483 for a
married decedent with no dependent children.63 Although this disparity in
awards for single versus married victims was criticized by persons submitting
comments during the rulemaking process,' Mr. Feinberg chose not to alter this
feature of the grid.
The principal reason why there is such a dramatic difference between the
size of the personal consumption deduction for single decedents with no
dependents compared to married persons (or single persons with dependents)
can be found in the formula used to calculate the deduction. For married
persons or single persons with dependents, the personal consumption
deduction is calculated as a share of certain expenditure
categories-specifically, the decedent's share of food, apparel and services,
transportation, entertainment, personal care products and services, and
59. See Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, A Law and Economics Perspective on the Personal
Consumption Deduction in Wrongful Death Litigation, 7 J. OF LEGAL ECON. 1, 2 (1997-98)
(describing various methods for calculating personal consumption deduction among the states).
60. See EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC Loss, supra
note 56, at Table 4.
61. Id.
62. See id. at Tables 4 & 5.
63. Id. at Table 5. Similarly, a single decedent leaving a dependent child is presumed to
have $1,028,998 in losses. Id.
64. See Individual Comment on Interim Rule from New York, N.Y.,
N002263 (Jan. 28, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan28/N002263.html (expressing concerns
for the plight of unmarried domestic partners and engaged persons); Individual Comment on
Interim Rule from Garden City, N.Y., N002368 (Jan. 22, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice,
available at http://911digitalarchive.org/doj/emails/N002368.html ("If a victim was
engaged to be married the chart showing Married Decedent with No Dependent Children
should be used."); Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Avon, Conn.,
N001927 (Jan. 17, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan23/N001927.html ("The disparity is far
too great without a reasonable explanation. It would appear that the single person is being
discriminated against.").
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miscellaneous expenses.65 However, for single persons without dependents,
the all-important categories of housing, education, and health are also
included. 66 This means, for example, that for a single decedent without
dependents, amounts spent on rent or mortgage payments for a residence will
be deducted from the award because it forms part of the personal consumption
deduction. For married decedents, however, there is no deduction for housing
expenses, not even for a portion representing the decedent's "share.
67
The document explaining the calculation of the personal consumption
deduction that appears on the Fund's website does not give a reason why a
different set of categories is used for the two groups. 6' However, a likely
explanation lies in the concept of "public goods" and in the acceptance of what
forensic economists call the "survivors' standard of living method" that is used
to calculate the personal consumption deduction.69 In the context of a
household, a "public" or "common" good is defined as an important item that
is indivisible, in the sense that it is difficult to assign a share of the good to the
individual household members. A refrigerator is an example of such a public
good-one economist explains that it is hard for survivors to do without a
refrigerator and that "realistically, there is no such thing as a fraction of a
refrigerator."7
At first blush, it would seem that housing would also fall within the
"public goods" category because it is an important item that cannot easily be
divided after a family member's death. When a family member dies, survivors
must still have shelter and cannot easily retain only their portion of the house
or the apartment. However, in another sense, housing costs may be divisible.
It is not difficult to conceive of a method that would assign the decedent a
share of the housing costs, for example, by dividing the amount of rent by the
number of adults living in a household. Excluding such a significant expense
from the personal consumption calculation may thus seem unrealistic, and
such exclusion has not escaped criticism.7' It is at this point in the analysis
that the survivors' standard of living method for calculating the personal
consumption deduction comes into play. The theory underlying the method
is that survivors are entitled to the same standard of living as they enjoyed
before the death of the income earner. 72 The model is based on a prototype of
65. See EXPLANATiON OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC LOSS, supra
note 56, at 2. The expenditure data was based on a table published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1999.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Depperschmidt, supra note 59, at 5.
70. Id. at 6 (citing GERALD A. MARTIN, DETERMINING ECONOMIC DAMAGES (1995)).
71. For example, Professor Depperschmidt argues that under the logic of the survivors'
standard of living method, no one ends up paying for the household's public goods. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
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the death of a principal breadwinner (often described in gendered terms as the
"father") who leaves behind dependents (also often described in gendered
terms as the "wife and children"). Under the model, a convincing argument
can be made that to insure that the family's standard of living is not lowered
upon the death of the principal breadwinner, no deduction representing the
cost of housing should be made from an award. By thus keeping the personal
consumption deduction low, there is a greater chance that the family will not
have to change residences after the death and may continue living in the family
home.
The decision to exclude housing, health, and education as categories of
expenditures used to calculate the personal consumption deduction under the
Fund seems consistent with the public goods concept and the survivors'
standard of living method for calculating the personal consumption
deduction.74 Although there is some question as to whether housing, health,
and education are truly indivisible, each category represents expenditures that
are important to a family's well-being and the sharp curtailment of funds for
them after a family member's death would likely disrupt a family's standard
of living. The important point here is that buried in the intricacies of
calculating the personal consumption deduction-in both torts and under the
Fund-lies a policy decision to depart from an individualistic measure of a
person's worth and to dispense significantly higher awards in death cases in
which spouses or children are left behind.
1. Treatment of Same-Sex and Unmarried Couples
The disparity in the treatment of single versus married decedents has
important implications for same-sex and unmarried heterosexual couples.
75
The administrative rules give the right to claim compensation under the Fund
to the deceased victim's "personal representative," the term of art used to
describe the person who represents the victim's estate.
76 In those cases in
73. See DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 55, § 111.21 ("Housing is generally
excluded in the determination of the deceased's cost of maintenance on the assumption that the
surviving family members would not be expected to move to a smaller home once the deceased
is gone. Indeed, the goal of replacing and/or maintaining the family's living standard would
appear to be defeated if the family were provided replacement support based on a decreased
expenditure for housing.").
74. See Depperschmidt, supra note 59, at 5-9.
75. For a comprehensive discussion of the rights of same-sex partners under the Fund,
see Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: Defining
Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 31 (2002). At least one news account has indicated
that there were 22 known gay surviving partners of the terror attacks. See Jane Gross, U.S.
Fund for Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at At.
Another news story cited a fiancee support group with 40 members. See Q & A: 'She is Still
Missing to Us', NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2002, at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/75952
9 .asp.
76. September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2003).
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which an unmarried domestic partner has been designated as the executor of
the deceased's will, he or she would qualify as the personal representative with
the right to decide whether to make a claim under the Fund. In cases in which
the deceased died intestate, however, it is not clear that a domestic partner
would qualify as the personal representative; instead, the determination is
governed by the law of the state where the deceased was domiciled.77 Thus,
in some cases, the deceased's next of kin, rather than the domestic partner,
would be afforded the right to decide whether to sue or to seek compensation
under the Fund.
In May 2002, the New York legislature passed an unusual piece of
legislation aimed at making it easier for domestic partners of victims to be
named as personal representatives.78 This Act's preamble declares that the
legislature intended that domestic partners be able to file claims with the Fund
and arguably allows Mr. Feinberg to interpret New York law as affording
domestic partners the rights of personal representatives.79 This legislation,
however, affects only those victims who were domiciled in New York at the
time of the attacks.
Additionally, the question of whether an unmarried domestic partner is
entitled to receive payments from the Fund is distinct from the issue of
determining the personal representative, although the end result may be the
same. Under the Fund, personal representatives are bound to distribute the
award in a manner consistent with either the deceased's will or the applicable
state's law governing intestate succession. 0 Thus, when a domestic partner
has been designated as a beneficiary under the decedent's will, he or she is
likely to receive compensation. Only rarely, however, will a domestic partner
be recognized under state law as an heir in cases in which the deceased dies
77. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,242-43.
78. The September 1 th Victims and Families Relief Act, 2001 N.Y. Laws 11290. The
text of the September 11 th Victims and Families Relief Act describes its legislative intent as
providing that:
domestic partners of victims of the terrorist attacks are eligible for distributions from the
federal victim compensation fund ... and other existing state laws, regulations, and
executive orders should guide the federal special master in determining awards and
ensuring that the distribution plan compensates such domestic partners for losses they
sustained.
2001 N.Y. Laws 11290, § 1.
79. 2001 N.Y. Laws 11290, § 1. One news account states that in cases in which the next
of kin of the deceased pose no objection, Mr. Feinberg has indicated that the domestic partner
is all but assured of receiving an award. In situations when the next of kin is not supportive of
the domestic partner, Mr. Feinberg has indicated that he will review the case individually,
taking into account that the legislature and Governor of New York have expressed their desire
to support same-sex partners. See Gross, supra note 75, at Al.
80. 28 C.F.R. § 104.52 ("The Personal Representative shall distribute the award in a
manner consistent with the law of the decedent's domicile or any applicable rulings made by
a court of competent jurisdiction.").
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without a will." In such cases of intestate succession, the personal
representative may not be obliged to distribute the award to the domestic
partner.
82
The final wrinkle in determining the treatment of domestic partners under
the Fund involves the interplay of the personal consumption deduction with
the designation of same-sex or unmarried couples as single persons under the
law. As mentioned previously, the presumed economic loss for a single
decedent is significantly lower than it is for a married person with the same
age and income profile. 3 This disparity means that even if a domestic partner
is entitled to an award under the Act, the award will be less than if the couple
had been married." To this extent, the economic dependency of same-sex or
other domestic partners is not given the same value or recognition that spouses
receive. Neither tort law nor the Fund acknowledges the fact that the standard
of living of a domestic partner who shared a household with the decedent will
be adversely affected by a lower award-an award that is produced by
applying the personal consumption deduction established for single persons.
The disparity in awards between same-sex (or unmarried) couples and
married couples reflects the Fund's ambivalent attitude toward gay families
and its lingering sexist and heterosexist notions of dependency. Mr. Feinberg
has made it clear through his public statements that he is not hostile to gay
partners and may be inclined to exercise his discretion in individual cases to
aid same-sex partners.8 5 However, the protection given by the rules to same-
sex partners is limited and depends to a large extent on whether the couple
took advantage of estate planning measures prior to the attacks.8 6 Importantly,
Mr. Feinberg took no action to erase this disparity in awards; for example, he
could have declared that decedents who died leaving a domestic partner would
81. Only a few states allow domestic partners to benefit from state intestate succession
laws. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401(c), 6402 (Supp. 2003) (providing inheritance rights
for domestic partners); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:2-102, 572c (2003) (granting rights and
obligation conferred through marriage to reciprocal beneficiaries); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1204(e)(1) (applying intestate succession laws to parties in a civil union).
82. For victims domiciled in New York, special legislation providing that domestic
partners are eligible to receive distributions under the Fund may suffice to provide Mr. Feinberg
with the necessary authorization under state law to assure that domestic partners receive an
award. See 2001 N.Y. Laws 11290.
83. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
84. Of course, Mr. Feinberg can exercise his discretion to alter an award if the claimant
requests individualized consideration. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.33.
85. See supra note 79.
86. Similarly, Congress passed a bill extending the $250,000 federal death benefit to
domestic partners of firefighters and police officers who died in the line of duty. The bill was
named after Mychal Judge, the chaplain of the New York Fire Department who died on
September 11. Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-196, 116 Stat. 719 (2002). However, the benefit is accorded only to
partners named as a beneficiaries of victims' life insurance policies.
2003]
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be treated as "married" for purposes of determining the personal consumption
deduction.87 Instead, the Fund relies on the grid for determining awards and
systematically disadvantages same-sex couples in a way that is hidden from
view by application of the personal consumption deduction. The operation of
the Fund is thus an illustration of a "neutral" stance toward same-sex and
unmarried couples that translates into material disadvantage, at least if the
yardstick used is the treatment accorded married couples.
The disparity in treatment between married and single persons also
highlights a basic tension in the values underlying wrongful death awards
under the Fund. To a significant degree, the calculation of presumed
economic loss reflects a desire to provide for survivors and to ensure that those
who were economically dependent on the deceased do not suffer hardship.
The "advantage" given to married decedents via the personal consumption
deduction reflects a familiar model of dependency in which surviving spouses
and minor children are presumed to be dependent, while other members of a
household are presumed to be independent. In particular, the model of the
survivors' standard of living is consistent with the idea that families (i.e.,
traditional families) are characterized by relations of economic dependency
that ought to receive special recognition in the law. 8
The question whether the grid is an equitable starting point for
determining awards thus may depend on whether the relations of economic
dependency in a given family actually comport with the assumptions
embedded in the grid. Insofar as economically dependent same-sex partners
are afforded less compensation than similarly situated married couples, the
grid seems unfair. Basing the amount of compensation simply on whether the
couple is married is arbitrary and reinforces the inequity of denying same-sex
couples the right to marry.
It should be noted, however, that some might also object to the continued
application of a survivors' standard of living approach in cases involving
87. Such an adjustment in the application of the personal consumption tables would not
have been inconceivable. Notably, when Mr. Feinberg received complaints that the standard
tables for determining work-life expectancy disadvantaged women as a class, he decided to use
the "male" tables for both male and female victims. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying
text.
88. See Depperschmidt, supra note 59, at 5-9. Some might contend that surviving
spouses should be entitled to maintain their standard of living, regardless of whether they were
economically dependent on their spouse during the marriage. The argument would be that, even
if each spouse earned enough for self-support before the death, each had a legitimate
expectation that he or she would continue to benefit from the income stream provided by the
other spouse for the duration of the marriage. When the prototype shifts to a "dual-career"
marriage, however, replacing the deceased spouse's lost contribution no longer seems as
compelling and it may be difficult to distinguish such a case from, for example, the case of a
single decedent who leaves his entire estate to his brother in his will. The question then
becomes: Why should the personal consumption deduction be so much less in the case of a
self-sufficient spouse than in the case of the brother?
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married couples without children where each spouse earns a considerable
income and neither spouse can be said to be dependent on the other. The
larger debate lurking beneath the question of differing personal consumption
rates for married and single persons is whether compensation ought to be
keyed to the needs of the survivors, or should be more strictly a measure of the
decedent's individual loss, without regard to the needs or identity of
survivors.8 9 In this regard, the Fund reflects the ambivalence found in tort
doctrine governing compensation for death. Some states embrace a "wrongful
death" approach that takes the perspective of survivors and seeks to provide
for the needs of dependent family members. Other states use a "survival" or
"loss to the estate" approach that seeks to recoup what the deceased victim
could have accumulated over time and to reimburse the heirs, regardless of
whether they were ever economically dependent upon the decedent.
9 ° With
respect to the calculation of presumed economic loss, however, the Fund
seems principally to reflect the survivors' needs perspective, with the notable
exception of its failure to assure equal treatment for same-sex and unmarried
couples.
2. Capping Economic Damages
In addition to the advantage given to married persons under the Fund,
another important aspect of the presumed economic losses chart is that it
determines presumed losses only up to a yearly salary level of $231,000,
representing the 98th percentile of individual income in the United States.
9
Although Mr. Feinberg insists that this is not actually a cap because claimants
may ask for a hearing and assert individualized circumstances,
92 he has also
indicated that awards rarely will exceed three or four million dollars.
3
89. Seegenerally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 17.11.2, at 455 (1999) ("Is the emphasis
on compensation for the perceived losses of current claimants or on the deterrence of total
losses to all injured parties? The former leads to damage measures that focus on losses to
survivors; the latter to rules that focus on losses to the decedent's estate.").
90. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 41, § 8.3(1), at 422-24 (distinguishing two approaches);
WEX S. MALONE, TORTS: INJURIES TO FAMILY, SOCIAL AND TRADE RELATIONS § 2-9, at 44-45
(1979) (contrasting survival with wrongful death action).
91. See Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,237.
92. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,234 (Supplementary Information: Statement by the
Special Master) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
93. In his statement accompanying the Interim Rule, Mr. Feinberg expressed the view:
[T]he purpose of the Act is not simply to examine economic and noneconomic harm, but
also to provide compensation that is just and appropriate in light of claimants' individual
circumstances. We have concluded that any methodology that does nothing more than
attempt to replicate a theoretically possible future income stream would lead to awards that
would be insufficient relative to the needs of some victims' families, and excessive relative
to the needs of others.
Interim Rule, supra note 1, at 66,274.
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Claimants dissatisfied with the presumptive award must argue that their
individual case presents "extraordinary circumstances" that warrant a higher
award.
It is interesting that Mr. Feinberg is apparently worried about depleting
the Fund, even though it is financed from general revenues and there is no
limitation on the aggregate amount that may be awarded. This gesture to
"'cap" economic damages is unusual because most often tort reform has
resulted in caps being placed on noneconomic damages or on the total amount
of compensation.95 In contrast to caps on noneconomic damages, which
disproportionately affect women and less affluent victims,96 caps on economic
damages tend adversely to affect the more affluent victims because, of course,
members of this group suffer greater income loss when they are injured or
killed. Moreover, the Fund's mandatory deduction of amounts received
through collateral sources is also likely to affect wealthier families to a greater
extent, because they were better able to afford insurance and other benefits
prior to the accident. 97 In this respect, the Fund resembles social insurance
schemes that expressly target low-income and middle-income families, with
the notable qualification that the Fund's generous ninety-eight percent
limitation covers the economic losses of all but the most affluent families.
Mr. Feinberg's approach to limiting economic damages suggests that, even
within a system of individualized justice, perceived need can play a legitimate
role. In a statement defending his position, Mr. Feinberg referred to language
in the Air Safety Act that permits him to take into account the "individual
circumstances of the claimant"'98 in determining the award. Rather than
interpret the language as merely authorizing an increase in an award in cases
of financial hardship, Mr. Feinberg reads the statutory language as giving him
the discretion more generally to take into account the financial needs of the
claimants and to impose a limit on awards he deems excessive. To this end,
Mr. Feinberg has announced that "multi-million dollar awards out of the
public coffers are not necessary to provide [families] a strong economic
foundation from which to rebuild their lives."
This presumptive upper limit on recovery prompted families of very high
earners with potentially large deductions for collateral sources to challenge the
94. September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.31(b)(1),
104.33(0(2) (2003).
95. Professor Dobbs reports that well over half the states have enacted some kind of cap
on damages, either on noneconomic damages only or on the total amount of tort damages. See
2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 384, at 1071-73 (2000); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 787-88 (7th ed. 2001) (stating that nearly
all states have enacted some kind of tort reform within the last 25 years).
96. The Architecture ofBias, supra note 20, at 519-21. See generally Lucinda M. Finley,
Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REv. 847 (1997).
97. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
98. See Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(b)(l)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. 230,238 (2001).
99. Interim Rule, supra note 1, at 66,278.
[Vol. 71:51
2003] SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 69
legality of the regulations. In Colaio v. Feinberg,"° the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York rejected a claim that the rules governing the
Fund were outside the authority of the Act and thus invalid. The central issue
in the case was whether Mr. Feinberg had the authority to award families of
high earners less than their full economic losses and to take into account the
financial needs of the claimants."' The court interpreted congressional intent
as delegating broad discretion to the Special Master and as permitting awards
for economic losses that do not always replicate what would be allowed under
state tort law. 102
The Special Master's effort to curb awards under the Fund is consistent
with an emphasis on the needs and dependency of survivors, which, like the
advantage given to married victims discussed above,'
°3 departs from an
individualistic view of compensation that would simply replace the income the
deceased would have earned. However, this effort to "shave off the top" is not
dramatic and does not transform the Fund into a compensation program based
primarily on need rather than on income loss. Like traditional torts, the
amount of economic loss is still calculated primarily based on the amount of
past earnings, and the amount of the total award is still largely dependent on
the calculation of economic losses.'14
B. Gender Equity: Calculating Lost Future Earning Capacity
and the Value of Homemakers'Services
Although it is not often stated explicitly, the prototypical 9/11 victim is
likely to be male, in part because most of those who died in the attacks were
indeed men.1"5 There were, however, 739 women killed at the World Trade
Center and the other two locations.1t6 For these female victims, two little-
noticed provisions in the Interim and Final Rules are potentially quite
significant.
100. 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 298-301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). For a pre-decision analysis of the
issues in the case, see Jonathan D. Melber, Note, An Act of Discretion: Rebutting Cantor
Fitzgerald's Critique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749 (2003).
101. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
102. Id. at 293 ("The Act did not mandate that some advantages to plaintiffs existing in
particular state laws should be reflected in compensation awards to claimants." (emphasis in
original)).
103. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
105. The ratio of male to female victims at the World Trade Center was approximately 3
to 1. WTC STATISTICS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 VICTIMS, www.septemberl lvictims.com, at
http://www.septemberllvictims.com/septemberlvictims/wtc-statistics.htm (last visited Nov.
26, 2003).
106. See F.B.I., U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2001, at 302(2002),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_0 1/0 1 crime5.pdf.
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The first provision relates to the calculation of economic loss and the
formula for determining the amount of income a person would have earned
during her lifetime (i.e., loss of future earning capacity). °7 Briefly stated, loss
of future earning capacity is typically measured by the number of years the
person would have worked had she not been injured ("work-life expectancy")
and the amount she would have earned each year, reduced to present value.'
A common practice in tort litigation for calculating lost future earning capacity
is to use separate gender-based tables, one for men and one for women.' °9
Although, in other areas of the law, the use of explicit gender classifications
is treated as suspect-both as a matter of policy and of constitutional
law' '--the use of gender-based tables to determine work-life expectancy has
often been uncritically accepted, perhaps because the practice is typically
buried within an expert witness's statistical report. Relying on such separate
gender-based economic tables, however, results in dramatically lower awards
for women."' This disparity arises because women have historically
interrupted their careers to raise families and have been pushed out of the
workplace by discriminatory practices, including pregnancy discrimination,
harassment, and unequal pay." 2 To some extent, however, these historical
patterns have abated, resulting in greater labor force participation by women,
even by mothers with young children." 3
A primary objection to the use of gender-based tables is that they tend to
reproduce the discriminatory patterns of the past, such as presuming that
women will continue to take long periods of time away from the workplace to
raise children. Use of gender-specific data also means that discrimination in
one area (e.g., the setting of pay rates) will influence the valuation of women's
lives in another area-namely, the calculation of personal injury and wrongful
death awards. '" As a result, women's groups and scholars have urged that the
use of gender-based tables be discontinued.' 5 They have argued that, in their
107. See Interim Rule, supra note 1, § 104.43, at 66,286; EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR
COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC Loss, supra note 56, at 1-3.
108. See Evelyn Esther Zabel, Note, A Plain English Approach to Loss of Future Earning
Capacity, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 253, 257-61 (1985).
109. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific
Economic Data In Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 79-84
(1994).
110. See id. at 104-11 (discussing constitutional challenges to gender-based
classifications).
I 11. See id. at 83-84 (estimating an award for a woman who becomes permanently
disabled would be only 65% of a similarly situated man's award).
112. See id. at 81-82.
113. In 1988,69.5% of women with children under six years of age worked full-time; the
figure rose to 71.2% in 2001. See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS (Eva E. Jacobs ed.,
6th ed. 2003).
114. See Chamallas, supra note 109, at 84-85.
115. See id. at 78; Martha F. Davis, Valuing Women: A Case Study, 23 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
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stead, either blended tables (i.e., gender-neutral tables) be used for all victims
or that "male" tables be used to determine work-life expectancy for both men
and women. Using gender-neutral tables tends to lower awards for men and
raise awards for women, in effect taking away the privilege of being male in
the workplace. Using male tables for both sexes has the effect of raising
women's awards without lowering awards for men. This latter method
assumes that women's lower awards are largely the result of gender bias and
that the male award represents a nondiscriminatory amount.
Initially there was some confusion as to whether the Special Master might
use gender-based tables in calculating awards under the Fund." 6  After
receiving written comments from the National Organization for Women
(NOW) and meeting with NOW Legal Defense Fund attorneys, Mr. Feinberg
announced in the Final Rule that he would use work-life expectancy tables for
males to calculate economic losses for both male and female victims.1 7 Mr.
Feinberg's decision to use the male tables for both men and women eliminates
any gender disparity in this portion of the award and means that women will
not be disadvantaged because of past discriminatory patterns or practices. In
keeping with the Fund's spirit of generosity, Mr. Feinberg's approach yields
a higher amount than would the use of a unitary or blended table for both
sexes, because it does not have the effect of "lowering" awards for men and
it raises women's awards to the higher male level."' Martha Davis, the former
Legal Director of the NOW Legal Defense Fund, has expressed the hope that
Mr. Feinberg's use of male work-life tables will set a precedent forjudges and
litigators that will carry over to the tort context."9 In this one respect, the
Fund may serve to raise expectations of tort plaintiffs seeking compensation
for wrongful death and personal injury.
The second aspect of the Fund that is of particular interest in the valuation
of the lives of women victims relates to the monetary value of household
services. Although both men and women perform unpaid work in the home,
this item disproportionately affects women because women continue to
perform a vastly disproportionate share of household services, 12 including not
REP. 219, 221 (2002); Sherri R. Lamb, Comment, Toward Gender-Neutral Data for
Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 299, 328-29 (1996); Letter from Martha Davis, Vice President and Legal Director, NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, to Kenneth L. Zwick, Director of Office of Management
Programs, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 22, 2002), available at NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, www.nowldef.org/html/nes/publiccomment.pdf (hereinafter
NOW Comment).
116. See Davis, supra note 115, at 220.
117. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,238; see also EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR
COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC Loss, supra note 56, at 3.
118. Mr. Feinberg's approach has previously been used in tort cases in Canada. For
commentary on this use, see Chamallas, supra note 109, at 100-04.
119. SeeDavis, supranote 115, at 222.
120. See id. at 220 (citing time-use study indicating that full-time working women
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only cleaning the house, cooking, and myriad other daily household tasks, but
also caring for children and other family members.' 2 ' Particularly because
women generally earn less than men in the paid workplace, any amount
awarded to compensate for unpaid labor may serve to offset the gender
disparity in wages and represents a nontrivial component of a female
claimant's total award.
The Interim Rule treated household services largely as noneconomic in
nature and ostensibly included them within the lump sum award given for
noneconomic damages.'22 Under the Interim Rule, household services were
considered to have an economic dimension and, thus, properly recoverable
under the category of economic losses, only for a narrow class of victims:
those who had no prior earned income (e.g., full-time homemakers) and those
who worked only part-time outside the home.'23 In such cases, a replacement
value measure of household services was used. 24
The Interim Rule's approach to household labor contained two flaws
commonly identified by feminist critics.125 First, it treated work done in the
home as if it were not "real" work, but merely an expression of love and
affiliation. Scholars such as Katharine Silbaugh have noted that courts have
tended to downplay or to ignore the economic value of housework, with the
consequence that women's household labor is often devalued in law. 26 Their
point is not that loving care and personalized attention have nothing to do with
housework. Rather it is that, in our market economy, activities classified as
noneconomic (as opposed to economic) and intangible (as opposed to tangible)
have a kind of second-class status and are often overlooked or diminished
when losses are calculated.
27
Second, the Interim Rule also made the mistake of thinking in terms of the
familiar "homemaker/working woman" dichotomy and assuming that only
typically perform 290 hours more unpaid work than men); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor
into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1996) (citing time-use studies
indicating that men's share of housework was only 60% of women's).
121. See Silbaugh, supra note 120, at 11.
122. See Interim Rule, supra note 1, § 104.46, at 66,286 (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.46
(2003)) ("Such presumed losses include any noneconomic component of replacement services
loss.").
123. See id. §§ 104.43(c), 104.45(c), at 66,286-87 (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.43(c),
104.45(c) (2003)).
124. Interim Rule, supra note 1, at 66,286. A more generous approach would have been
to measure the homemaker's contribution by reference to opportunity costs, particularly in cases
of persons whose educational level indicates that they could have earned significantly more in
the marketplace.
125. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTIONTO FEMINISTLEGALTHEORY 192-199 (2d
ed. 2003).
126. See Silbaugh, supra note 120, at 7-8.
127. See The Architecture of Bias, supra note 20, at 528-30.
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"homemakers" spend appreciable amounts of time working in the home.
28
Notably, there was no provision in the Interim Rule for awarding a sum to full-
time workers to compensate them for the loss of services they perform in the
home. This omission vastly underestimates the importance of household labor
for full-time workers. One survey, for example, reports that married women
working full time with children under the age of eighteen spend approximately
35.6 hours per week on household labor; the comparable figure for men is 26.9
hours.1
29
In these two respects (treating household labor as noneconomic and
overlooking the housework done by full-time employees), the Interim Rule
was less generous than most courts. As was pointed out by NOW in its
rulemaking comments, 130 it is accepted practice for courts to compensate
victims, including those who work full-time, for the value of replacement
services for their household work.1
3 1
In the Final Rule, Mr. Feinberg acknowledged these objections and
agreed that claimants, presumably including full-time employees, could
attempt to raise their award by presenting individualized data regarding the
cost of replacement services at a compensation hearing.' 32 However, this step
does little for claimants who do not want to go through the trouble and delay
of seeking an individual hearing. Here is one instance where an apparent lack
of reliable government data on the value of household services means that an
important component of damages has not been built into the grid for presumed
economic losses. 33 Unless compensation for household services is routinely
awarded as a component of economic loss, there is a risk that the Fund will
undervalue the lives of women and others who perform valuable unpaid labor.
C. A Lump Sum Approach to Noneconomic Losses
The most unusual feature of the September 1 th Victim Compensation
Fund is its approach to noneconomic damages. The definition of noneconomic
losses under the Air Safety Act is broad, encompassing "losses for physical
128. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 125, at 193-94.
129. See NOW Comment, supra note 115, at 7 (citing John Ward, John
Ward Economics Time-use Analysis, available at http://www.johnwardeconomics.com).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co., 506 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (E.D. Tex.
1981) (allowing compensation for deceased spouse's services in the home); Creel v. St. Charles
Gaming Co., 707 So. 2d 475 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding damages when injured wife was
no longer able to provide her prior level of household work and rejecting argument that such
damages are only proper where parties actually had hired help for such services); Cramer v.
Kuhns, 630 N.Y.S.2d 128, 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("We have long considered an injured
plaintiff's loss ... separate and apart from pain and suffering.").
132. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,239.
133. See Davis, supra note 115, at 220-21 (discussing lack of reliable United States data
compared to Canada and Australia).
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service),
hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of
any kind or nature."" 4 This long laundry list suggests that each kind of
intangible harm should be separately considered. With respect to
noneconomic damages, however, Mr. Feinberg opted for a lump sum approach
or what he calls "presumed equality." Although a claimant still has the right
to present individualized evidence if he or she requests a hearing, the rules set
a separate lump sum amount for each of two categories of noneconomic harm:
(1) the harm the victim suffered prior to death (the "survival" or "pre-impact"
damages 35), and (2) the intangible losses of family members stemming from
the victim's death (the "loss of consortium" or "relational harms" 36). The first
compensates for the pain, suffering, and other distress that the victim suffered
prior to death, while the second compensates survivors for their loss of
companionship, grief, and other pain.
Specifically, Mr. Feinberg set the presumed noneconomic award for
survival damages for all decedents at $250,000.' The rules assert that this
amount was chosen because it is the amount set under federal programs for
public safety officers who are killed while on duty and for members of the
United States military who are killed in the line of duty.' This lump sum
approach is very different from the individualized calculations of pre-impact
or survival damages in tort suits that are based on the victim's experience and
suffering prior to his or her death.'39 Mr. Feinberg has refused to evaluate the
different degrees of pain and anguish suffered by the 9/11 victims, based on
existing evidence such as a cell phone conversation with a spouse just prior to
death or being trapped in one of the towers above the impact area." In his
statement accompanying the Interim Rule, Mr. Feinberg remarked that he
feared that "[w]hile these circumstances may be knowable in a few
134. Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 402(7), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
135. See generally 2 DOBBS, supra note 41, § 8.3(2), at 425-26 (discussing survival
damages).
136. See generally 2 id. § 8.3(4)-(5), at 430-45 (discussing wrongful death and relational
damages).
137. See September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,28 C.F. R. § 104.44 (2003).
With respect to victims who suffered physical harm but did not die, the rules also set the
presumed noneconomic loss at $250,000, making adjustments, however, "based upon the extent
of the victim's physical harm." 28 C.F.R. § 104.46.
138. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,239 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (military personnel) and
42 U.S.C. § 3796 (public safety officers)).
139. See, e.g., Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1992)
(awarding $1,000,000 for the pre-death suffering of a boy pinned down by an automatic garage
door); Guzman v. Guajardo, 761 S.W.2d 506, 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding an award
of $600,000 for fifteen minutes of a child's severe pain before death).
140. Interim Rule, supra note 1, at 66,279.
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extraordinary circumstances, for the vast majority of victims these
circumstances are unknowable."'' In the Final Rule, Mr. Feinberg further
justified his decision to use a lump sum approach by noting the virtue of
having "some measure of consistency among awards" and relieving him of the
necessity.of "'play[ing] Solomon' by attempting to place a value on human
lives on an ad hoc basis."' 42
Some persons suspected different motives for the decision to set the
amount of noneconomic damages for decedents at $250,000. In an article for
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America convention, Cynthia Lebow
asserted that "it has been widely reported, and Mr. Feinberg has conceded, that
the amount was negotiated with the White House, the Justice Department, and
the Office of Management and Budget."' 43  In Ms. Lebow's view, the
$250,000 represents the kind of low cap on pain and suffering damages that
tort reformers have long sought. Indeed, the families of many victims objected
that the amount was too low and that it dishonored the memory of those
killed.
144
However, it should be noted that under the Fund, the $250,000 cap is not
designed to measure the total value of the victim's life; it is merely the amount
accorded for survival damages, representing only the pain and suffering the
victim experienced just prior to death. In litigated cases, the pain and suffering
award for a victim who dies is often lower than the pain and suffering award
of a person who survives and is disabled, simply because the survivor suffers
for the remainder of his or her life. Thus, the more controversial application
141. Id.
142. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,239.
143. Lebow, supra note 2, at *9; see also Comment on Interim Rule, Cantor Fitzgerald
L.P., New York, N.Y.'s, N002305 (Jan. 22, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan28/N002305.html (indicating that the
$250,000 limit was negotiated with the White House Office of Management and Budget and
that $250,000 for pain and suffering is a cornerstone of GOP tort reform legislation).
144. See, e.g., Comment on Interim Rule from Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Family
Group, P000316 (Jan. 31, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.911digitalarchive.org/doj/emails/P000316.html (noting that the presumed award for
noneconomic losses is "the most glaring insult to the Congressional commitment made to the
families"); Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Garden City, N.Y., N002368 (Jan. 22,
2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at http://91 i digitalarchive.org/doj/emails/NO02368.html
("In many cases the September I I victims suffered indescribable pain, agony and mental
anguish for prolonged periods of time (up to several hours)... [and] were aware that they were
going to die a horrible and painful death."); Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Darien,
Conn., N002196 (Jan. 21, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan25/N002196.html ("[M]any ... were
incensed at the amounts being suggested."); Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Jersey
City, N.J., N002469 (Jan. 18, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/interim/njan3l/N002469.html ("Non-economic
losses are far too low. .. they are one-tenth of those made in comparable cases.").
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of the $250,000 lump sum is its use as a starting point for determining the pain
and suffering of 9/l1 victims who survived the attacks.
Mr. Feinberg's reluctance to distinguish among victims with respect to
awards for survival damages is a pragmatic response characteristic of an
administrative no-fault fund. Because there was no readily available matrix
or grid that could be used to evaluate different classes of claims with respect
to this component of damage, Mr. Feinberg essentially had three choices:
(1) award a lump sum; (2) award no damages; or (3) afford everyone an
individualized hearing. As can be seen from his choice to rely on a grid to
calculate presumed economic losses, Mr. Feinberg apparently did not envision
his mission as administrator of the Fund as involving the adjudication of
thousands of individual claims, although to do so would not have been
impossible. Instead, the decision to award a lump sum mirrors the Fund's
approach to presumed economic damages; it encourages (perhaps even
pressures) claimants to accept a set amount, but allows for the possibility of
individualized review to those few who insist upon it. What is potentially lost
by not affording individualized hearings as a matter of course, however, is the
opportunity for family members to relate and reconstruct the specifics of their
loss in an official proceeding. For some claimants, the difficulty of placing a
value on their loved ones' lives might be compounded, rather than alleviated,
by the Fund's refusal to treat victims as unique individuals and to take the time
necessary to document and understand their suffering prior to death.
I am somewhat surprised, however, that Mr. Feinberg chose to award any
sum at all for survival damages. A common argument against awarding
survival damages is that once the victim has died, there is no longer any need
to compensate him for pain and suffering prior to death. Moreover, it is clear
that this category of loss properly belongs to the deceased, not to the claimants
or survivors. Thus, some states, including California, 45 have abolished
survival damages of this sort.'46 Particularly when there is no possibility of
deterring a defendant's behavior by awarding a sum for pre-impact suffering,
it is not easy to come up with a rationale for allowing such an award. In this
respect, the lump sum award for the decedent's death afforded under the Fund
appears to take the deceased's, as opposed to the survivors', perspective in
measuring losses to a deceased's estate.
In my view, the $250,000 lump sum award treats the 9/11 victims more
like heroes than like tort victims, although there is a serious question as to
whether the amount was set high enough to carry this message.147 The lump
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1992).
146. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 95, § 295, at 806 (discussing statutory exclusions for pre-
death pain and suffering).
147. See Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Darien, Conn., N002196, supra note
144 ("[Wlhy not raise the non-economic settlement award to an amount that reflects the
supreme sacrifice these civilians and their families made unwillingly and unknowingly? So
much rhetoric is bandied about-that the victims are true war heroes. Compensate them
[Vol. 71:51
2003] SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 77
sum award is akin to a memorial to their memory 48 and accordingly treats all
victims alike.'49 It is noteworthy that Mr. Feinberg has also indicated that he
will use his discretion to assure, as far as possible, that most families of
victims who died will receive a minimum of $250,000 from the Fund (after
collateral source deductions), except in rare cases where the claimant has
already received very substantial compensation from collateral sources."'
This guaranteed award to the families of "heroes" is a new form of
compensation that is not recognized in tort.
Treating all the 9/11 victims as heroes has the political advantage of
drawing a distinction between them and ordinary tort victims, thus perhaps
reducing the "horizontal equity" problem to the narrower question of whether
victims of similar attacks (such as the Oklahoma City bombing) should also
be compensated. But the analogy is strained because most of the 9/11 victims
were not police officers or rescue workers, but ordinary people. 5' Insofar as
the September 11 th Fund is simply a substitute for lawsuits against the airlines,
it seems disingenuous to downplay the similarities between the 9/11 victims
and ordinary tort victims.
With respect to relational losses of the families of victims who died, Mr.
Feinberg also opted for a non-individualized, lump sum approach. Under the
Final Rule, a spouse and each dependent of a decedent will receive $100,000
for his or her noneconomic relational losses, an award that is akin to an award
for loss of consortium.'52 The amount was raised from a proposed
$50,000-the amount that had been set in the Interim Rule-in response to
critical comments submitted during the rulemaking process.'53
Even this augmented amount strikes me as quite stingy. The sum is
designed to compensate persons for what one group of psychologists who
submitted comments to the Fund described as "the profound psychological
ramifications of experiencing the traumatic loss of a loved one."' 54 Tort
accordingly! !").
148. I am grateful to Professor Paul J. Zwier II for this insight.
149. It should be noted that, at least in theory, lump sum awards, such as these that are not
even implicitly tied to economic losses, may favor less affluent victims. The lump sum
approach contrasts sharply with the approach in tort cases where fact-finders often use
economic losses as an anchor upon which to base their calculation of noneconomic damages.
150. Final Rule, supra note 1, at 11,241.
151. See Comment on Interim Rule from Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Family Group,
P000316, supra note 144 ("[I]t is hard to understand how the suffering of a group of civilians
killed in the offices in which they worked, completely unprepared for the risk of violent deaths
and injuries which they suffered, could be equated with public safety officers who have
voluntarily chosen to put themselves at the risk of injury and even death as part of their daily
job.... The situations are not analogous and any attempts to draw such analogy are insulting
to the victims....").
152. Final Rule, supra note i, at 11,239.
153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
154. Individual Comment on Interim Rule from Stony Brook, N.Y.,
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awards for relational harm respond to the fact that a family member's life often
changes dramatically with the loss of a parent or spouse.'55 There is evidence
that the effects of a sudden, traumatic loss of a family member are more severe
than those suffered from "normal" losses and that, in addition to grief, family
members may experience traumatic stress symptoms."5 6 Family members
under such circumstances may need to receive counseling and other treatment
for mental health problems that often accompany trauma, such as depression,
anxiety, and a predisposition to suicide. Moreover, in contrast to the pain and
suffering of victims who die shortly after an attack, the emotional harm to
survivors can be long-term. These are real, pressing losses to survivors that
are not adequately captured in the lump sum award of$ 100,000. Insofar as the
Fund undervalues this component of relational harm, it undermines the Fund's
capacity to provide fully for the needs of survivors and seems at odds with the
"needs" orientation of the Fund as it relates to presumed economic loss.
Additionally, there is less justification for using a lump sum approach
when it comes to relational harms. Unlike the dilemma surrounding survival
damages, in which the precise circumstances regarding an individual's death
were unknowable for most victims, living claimants and family members can
relate in precise and individualized terms how the death of their spouse or
parent has adversely affected their lives and what resources they need to cope
with the trauma. Setting a presumed amount has the unfortunate effect of
discouraging family members from telling their individual stories of loss and
using the proceedings to construct meaning out of their tragedy.
The $100,000 lump sum award for relational harm is even less
individualized than the grid for economic losses because nothing about the
individual or his relationship to the victim is taken into account, except for the
designation as spouse or dependent. Moreover, there is also no indication that
other persons who suffered severe relational loss, such as unmarried domestic
partners or parents who lost a child, will be entitled to the award. It seems
that, despite Congress's enumeration of the various kinds of nonpecuniary
injuries,'57 Mr. Feinberg was intent on keeping the figure for noneconomic
losses low and responding in a categorical fashion. Sadly, I fear that the
Fund's lump sum approach to relational losses will serve only to further
marginalize this important element of damages.'58
P000490 (Jan. 24, 2002), U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/postinterim/pfebl4/P000490.html.
155. Although some state wrongful death statutes continue to limit recovery to economic
losses, individualized tort litigation allows plaintiffs more opportunity to characterize relational
harms, such as medical expenses stemming from trauma, as economic. See 2 DOBBS, supra
note 95, § 297, at 811-12.
156. See Individual Comment on Interim Rule, P000490, supra note 154.
157. See Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 10742, § 402(7), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001).
158. See The Architecture ofBias, supra note 20, at 500-03 (discussing the marginalization
of relational harms).
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III. CONCLUSION
Like the tort system itself, the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund
neither reflects a consistent social vision nor furthers a coherent compensation
philosophy. Instead, the Fund is a blended scheme that combines features of
a tort-like system of individualized justice with a no-fault insurance system.
The Fund is partly animated by a desire to provide for the needs of surviving
family members and partly designed to compensate the victim's estate for
losses traceable to the death, regardless of the needs of survivors. It infuses
considerations of gender equity and financial need into a scheme that largely
seeks to restore the status quo ante. Although it is not oblivious to the plight
of same-sex couples and nontraditional families, it does not treat them on a par
with married couples. It is generous for a no-fault fund, but the awards,
particularly for noneconomic damages, provide far less that would likely be
awarded in a tort suit. In short, the Fund is a political compromise.
In a speech at the annual meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools,'59 Mr. Feinberg indicated that he would have preferred a
compensation system that provided the same amount to everyone, with no
limitation on the right to sue. Such a scheme certainly would have been easier
to administer and would have entailed less paperwork for families. Depending
on the amount given to each family, perhaps affluent families would have been
more inclined to sue under such a scheme. But if there were no limitations on
filing suit, doing so would represent their choice. The critical issue is whether
such a simple approach would have been preferable to the more complicated
program devised by Congress and Mr. Feinberg.
Without knowing the amount of such an across-the-board compensation
award, it is impossible for me to answer the question posed. For the most part,
I have little difficulty with Mr. Feinberg's and Congress's attempts to bring
down the top awards by instituting a quasi-cap on economic damages and by
deducting collateral sources. Because the Fund is financed by general federal
revenues, it seems wise not to try to replace the entire loss of affluent families,
at least if the money "saved" is used to provide a secure economic foundation
for more needy families. Unfortunately, the amounts provided under the Fund
for noneconomic damages are inadequate and serve to reinforce the prevailing
view that these kinds of losses are of less importance. By giving short shrift
to noneconomic losses, the Fund continues to use economic loss as the
principal yardstick by which to measure compensation, albeit tempered around
the edges by considerations of need and social equity. The Fund may be a
good political compromise, but its redistribution of income does not alter the
status quo dramatically enough truly to treat all the 9/11 victims like heroes.
159. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Address on Insurance Compensation after September 11 at the
American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 2003).

